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Abstract 
 
Purpose: The paper seeks to complement a more conventional PAT-based study of 
accounting method choice in Egyptian firms (Dey et al., 2007) by examining three alternative 
computational reasons for depreciation method choice: simplicity; compatibility with industry 
norm; and suitability for class of asset. 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper draws on a questionnaire survey, sent to Egyptian 
companies, in which managers were asked to indicate their reasons for choosing depreciation 
methods as well as the actual depreciation methods used. 
Findings: The paper finds that technical reasons were frequently given in survey responses 
from managers. However, the available evidence on the actual depreciation methods used by 
their firms and industries is in fact more consistent with PAT-based theories of accounting 
choice than with such alternatives. This suggests that the responses to the survey reflected 
managers’ rationalisations of decisions made for self-interested purposes. 
Originality/value: Most recent work on managerial decisions concerning accounting choices 
utilises data gathered from databases of published financial information and is undertaken 
within a PAT context. This study extends that approach by utilising the results of a 
questionnaire distributed in Egypt to test some additional hypotheses that reflect possible 
technical accounting reasons for justifying depreciation methods.  
 
Keywords: Accounting method choice, depreciation, Egypt. 
Classification: Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical research on accounting method choice has tended to explain and predict managers’ 
accounting choices by reference to positive accounting theory (PAT) (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986; 1990). Conventional PAT studies are conducted in a hypothetico-deductive style and 
test hypotheses concerning managerial behaviour using only data gathered from accounting 
statements. They generally make no attempt to ask managers why they have made particular 
accounting choices. This paper adds to the existing literature by exploring the extent to which 
Egyptian managers’ motives for making accounting method choices may be grounded in 
simpler, more pragmatic concerns. In particular, the paper considers the extent to which the 
widespread international usage of straight-line depreciation (SLD) (Gray et al., 1984), may 
owe more to practical or technical considerations than to notions of economic self-interest 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) or theoretical rigour (Green et al., 2002). Although PAT-based 
empirical research has dominated this part of the accounting literature for many years, it has 
also been subjected to sustained challenge on a number of levels (see, for example, Tinker et 
al., 1982; Sterling, 1990). 
 In addition to the hypotheses that underlie conventional PAT-based research, the 
paper identifies some alternative hypotheses for reasons for depreciation method choice in 
firms in Egypt that relate to technical accounting issues. These explanations include: (a) 
simplicity of calculation, (b) suitability for class of asset, and (c) conformity to industrial 
norm. The first of these possible explanations has been frequently raised in the accounting 
literature to support or recommend the use of straight-line depreciation (see, for example, 
Hendriksen and Van Breda, 1992). The second explanation, in contrast, attempts to link 
depreciation method choice to a more defensible technical rationale (see, for example, Baxter, 
1971). The third explanation put forward in this paper is inductively generated from pilot 
interviews with managers of Egyptian firms. It would be a rational reason for choice if 
managers desired their firms to be compared with others in their industry on the same basis, 
since the use of different methods of depreciation could be expected to reduce direct 
comparability. 
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 Reviews of accounting theory typically highlight the fact that inductive questions of 
the type outlined here originally preceded PAT-based research (Henderson et al., 1992). Such 
reviews frequently suggest inductive accounting research has often been limited in scope and 
depth because of its failure to evaluate practice adequately or to resolve wider normative 
questions about accounting (see, for example, Gray et al., 1996). However, its use in this 
paper is justified on two grounds. Firstly, in seeking to understand managerial motivations for 
accounting choice, this paper confronts the empirical investigation of such issues in a direct 
way. It uses an inductive questionnaire-based approach, informed by initial pilot interviews, 
to solicit managers’ views on the importance they attach to possible motives for accounting 
choice. Secondly, the inductive theorising and research in this paper is not intended to be 
mutually exclusive to a PAT-based approach. Instead, the paper explicitly seeks to (a) 
compare managers’ responses to both technical and PAT-based explanations for accounting 
choice and in doing so to (b) establish whether managers’ stated reasons for accounting 
choice are consistent with the available evidence. Conversely, although it examines 
alternatives, the paper does not attempt to dismiss PAT-based research. Indeed, it recognises 
that managers’ responses may be rationalisations of choices made to further their own 
economic self-interests. 
Following on from the empirical study undertaken by Dey et al. (2007), the research 
discussed in this paper is based on data gathered from a sample of firms operating in Egypt. 
The general economic climate in Egypt is characterised by a steady deregulation towards a 
more liberal market economy. Since the early 1990s, this has been accompanied by the 
renewal and expansion of the Cairo stock exchange and an accelerating program of 
privatisation (World Bank, 2001). Governmental support for the modernisation and growth of 
the economy has included a system of tax-based incentives. In Egypt, straight-line is the usual 
basis for calculating depreciation for tax purposes. Nevertheless, managers are allowed to use 
accelerated depreciation of up to 25% of the value of assets used in the modernisation of 
business processes (Abdel-Rahman, 2001). In this way, a range of depreciation methods is 
permitted by the tax regime. Dey et al. (2007) discussed the cultural issues that may affect 
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reporting choices in Egypt. These did not appear to produce behaviour that differs from that 
observed in more economically developed countries. Consequently, one could reasonably 
assume that the evidence of that paper has relevance beyond economically developing Islamic 
societies. 
It should be noted that the possible influence of technical reasons on managers’ 
accounting method choices cannot easily be inferred by correlating accounting choices 
against other variables in an ex post review of accounting statements. Consequently, in 
contrast to much conventional PAT-based research, this work requires a direct empirical 
approach that explicitly seeks out the views of managers involved. It is recognised in this 
paper that managers’ responses may not always reflect the real reasons for accounting 
choices. Nevertheless, we consider that they are a source of empirical data that merits 
examination. 
Although the empirical observations were undertaken in Egypt, there seem to be no 
compelling cultural or environmental reasons that would cause the observations to be 
inapplicable to other Middle Eastern countries. On the basis of the discussion in the previous 
section, different possible managerial reasons for accounting method choice may be 
identified, which incorporate both (a) a widely-recognised agency-based motive embodied in 
PAT-based research and (b) an alternative set of possible reasons which are related to 
technical accounting issues. They may be formally stated in theoretical hypotheses.  
 
2. Theoretical Hypotheses 
PAT-based research on accounting choice stems from clear assumptions regarding the agency 
issues surrounding the separation of ownership and control. In common with most PAT 
studies (see Fields et al., 2001), when establishing a hypothetical framework for accounting 
choice, this paper takes as its starting point the economic self-interest of managers who act as 
agents of business owners. If one accepts the usual perception of separation of ownership and 
control in large organisations, one can assume that managers will adopt depreciation methods 
that maximise their personal income. Hypothesis 1 below reflects that economic rationality:   
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H1.  Managers choose depreciation methods that enhance their own remuneration.  
 
This hypothesis appears to be strongly supported by significant statistical data in the earlier 
study using the survey data (Dey et al., 2007). Other possible PAT hypotheses, such as 
leverage, were also examined in that study, but did not receive the same level of support, so 
they will not be considered further here.  
 The previous section indicated the possible influence of some technical accounting 
issues on managers’ choices of depreciation method. These were (a) the minimisation of 
information processing costs (i.e. simplicity of calculation); (b) the suitability of the 
depreciation method to the class of asset concerned; and (c) the perceived need to comply 
with existing norms of accounting method choice within the firm’s industrial sector. These 
are reflected in hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 as follows: 
 
Managers choose depreciation methods for technical accounting reasons to: 
H2.   minimise information processing costs; 
H3. maximise the usefulness of the accounting information by choosing the most suitable 
depreciation method for the class of asset involved. 
H4.   maximise the comparability of their firms performance with those of other 
 firms in their industries; 
 
3. Alternative Empirical Hypotheses 
Given their origins in PAT-based research, the empirical application of hypothesis 1 is 
relatively straightforward. Hypothesis 1 asserts that managers will act to maximise their own 
income, which in conventional PAT studies generates the bonus-plan hypothesis. Agency 
theory is used to assert that the contractual incentives provided by owners – typically bonus 
schemes - will link corporate performance to managerial remuneration, and hence managers’ 
economic self-interest will be aligned with the interests of owners. In this scenario, and in the 
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context of accounting for depreciation, managers are assumed to choose straight-line 
depreciation in order to increase reported income. This topic and the development of the 
resulting hypotheses were extensively covered in Dey et al. (2007). Hypotheses H1e is the 
alternative empirical hypotheses for theoretical hypotheses H1 following this conventional 
thinking: 
H1e  (i) A majority of managers assign importance to the effect on net income for the 
choice of depreciation methods; 
(ii) There is a positive association between the use of management bonus schemes 
and the use of straight-line depreciation (SLD). 
 
Theoretical hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 asserted that managers will be guided by the technical 
desire to: minimise the costs of following a particular accounting method choice; maximise 
the usefulness of the accounting information by choosing the most suitable depreciation 
method for the class of asset involved; and/or comply with perceived norms of accounting 
method choice in their industries.  
As indicated above, it has been suggested (see, for example, Hendriksen, 1982) that a 
dominant reason for using SLD would be simplicity of calculations, which reduces the 
complexity and therefore the cost of calculations. This perception allows H2 to be tested by 
reference to H2e(i) and (ii): 
 
H2e (i) A majority of managers assign importance to the simplicity of calculations for 
the choice of depreciation methods. 
 (ii) There is a positive association between the importance which managers assign 
to the simplicity of calculations for the choice of depreciation methods and their use 
of SLD. 
 
Theoretical hypothesis H3 can be tested in a straightforward manner by reference to empirical 
hypotheses H3e(i) and H3e(ii): 
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H3e (i) A majority of managers assign importance to the suitability of method to the 
class of asset for the choice of depreciation methods. 
 (ii) There is a positive association between the importance which managers assign 
to the suitability of method to the class of asset for the choice of depreciation 
methods and the extent to which they use different methods for different classes of 
asset. 
 
Similarly, H4 can be tested by reference to H4e(i). The hypothesis H4e(ii) provides a test of 
the extent to which managers’ statements in H4e(i) are consistent with their behaviour: 
H4e (i) A majority of managers believe that the methods usually used in their industry 
are important to the choice of depreciation methods. 
 (ii) There is a positive association between managers’ statements that depreciation 
methods usually used in their industry are important and their use of the method 
that is mainly used in the industry. 
It should be noted that, in each case, part (ii) of the alternative hypothesis seeks to test the 
credibility of the survey responses that relate to part (i) of each hypothesis.  
 
4. Empirical Method 
 
In developing the propositions contained in the technical hypotheses, managers’ motivations 
must be explained through more direct empirical methods than those typically employed in 
PAT-based studies. By using a questionnaire-based method, data may be gathered about 
managerial responses to suggested motives for accounting policies, which is different to that 
available from databases. The availability of such data in this study allows the exploration of 
alternative motivations for accounting method choice, including a comparison of surveyed 
responses against available financial information. This enables the study to assess whether 
managers’ stated motives for their behaviour are consistent with their decisions.  
A questionnaire was distributed in 2002 to the 320 Egyptian firms with the largest net 
asset bases in the Cairo, Alexandria and Menoufia Governorates (the most industrialized areas 
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in Egypt). Ninety-three firms responded to the questionnaire, a response rate of 29%. 
Appendix 1 shows the survey questions that are relevant to this paper. The issue of non-
response bias was investigated using the idea that later respondents to a survey are more 
similar to non-respondents than are earlier respondents (Wallace and Mellor, 1988). 
Completed questionnaires were divided into two groups: those received in the first three 
weeks were placed in the first group. The first group consisted of 48 respondents while the 
second group consisted of 45 respondents. Based on the two groups, Mann-Whitney U-tests 
(Mann and Whitney, 1947) were applied to those variables that were measured on the ordinal 
scale; while for those questions based on a categorical scale, a chi-squared test was 
performed. Only two of the 42 variables tested showed a significant difference between 
groups at the 5% level. Since one would expect 2.1 variables out of 42 to be false positives 
[1] it is evident that the results of the first group in the sample are similar to those in the 
second group. This finding supports the presumption that the viewpoints of non-respondents 
were unlikely to be significantly different from those of respondents.  
  One could expect that firms would only use bonus schemes if their owners perceived 
a need to motivate and control managers as agents. Consequently, it is probable that a 
majority of firms that use bonus schemes are managed by agents and not owners (principals). 
The sampled firms could therefore also be categorised into (a) owner-managed (OM) (firms 
without bonus schemes) and (b) agent-managed (AM) (firms with bonus schemes) subsets 
This categorisation can help the interpretation of the subsequent analysis, and the distribution 
is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Categorisation of sample firms by bonus scheme usage 
 Number of firms % 
 No bonus scheme (Owner-managed) 43 46.2 
 Bonus scheme (Agent-managed) 50 53.8 
 Total 93 100.0 
 
 Table 2 shows the level of adoption of straight-line depreciation for each class of 
asset. A strong tendency to adopt SLD across all types of asset is evident, with 73 of the 93 
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surveyed firms doing so. Of the remaining 19 firms, only 3 chose to vary their use of 
depreciation method between SLD and alternative methods. The widespread preference for 
SLD in the sample data is consistent with a general international trend (Green et al., 2002), 
and with the usual taxation conventions in Egypt outlined earlier in this paper.  
 
Table 2: Adoption of straight-line depreciation method 
 Asset class Use SLD Do not use SLD 
 Buildings 73 19 
 Plant and machinery 73 19 
 Vehicles 73 19 
 Furniture 73 19 
 Computers and office equipment 76 16 
 
The remarkable consistency of depreciation method identified above implies that most 
managers do not differentiate between classes of asset in deciding which method of 
depreciation to use. Therefore, one would expect the responses to the questionnaire to reflect 
a low priority to the importance of suitability for class of asset. 
  Table 3 shows the distribution of depreciation choices by surveyed firms across 
industry types. Of the eleven industry sector categories used in the survey, seven exhibit what 
appears to be depreciation method ‘norms’ (being the use, or non-use, of SLD by at least 75% 
of firms in the sector). In contrast, only three relatively small sectors – Building Materials, 
Electrical Appliances and Wood & Paper - exhibit a clear mix of depreciation methods 
amongst firms. 
  The sectoral distribution of the respondent firms is compared with the corresponding 
distribution for the target population in Table 3. In order to confirm that the sample is 
representative of the population, a chi–squared test of the null to the hypothesis that the 
proportion of responses is the same for each sector was carried out. This test results in a chi–
squared goodness of fit statistic of 12.17 on 10 degrees of freedom, with a p–value of 0.274. 
Hence the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level, and concerns regarding bias 
from the sample to the population may not be serious. 
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Table 3: Sectoral distribution of firms 
Industry Sector Always Use SLD 
Never Use 
SLD 
Change 
Method 
Sample 
Total 
Target 
Population 
Response 
Rate (%) 
Textiles 15 5  20 43 46.5 
Food & Spirits 9   9 35 25.7 
Steel 3   3 6 50.0 
Chemical Production 8   8 34 23.5 
Construction 6 1  7 29 24.1 
Building Materials 2 2  4 25 16.0 
Hotels & Tourism  3  3 16 18.8 
Electrical Appliances 3 3  6 19 31.6 
Wood & Paper 2 1 2 5 22 22.7 
Communications 3   3 3 100.0 
Pharmaceuticals & 
Medical 9 1 1 11 36 30.6 
Other 14   14 52 26.9 
Total 74 16 3 93 320 29.1 
 
In contrast to the significance of asset class to depreciation method, this data appears to 
suggest that norms within industries may be important to managers, because the use of 
methods other than SLD appears to be concentrated in a relatively small number of different 
industry types. 
 The next section examines the responses given by sampled firms concerning the 
importance they attribute to the range of possible motives identified in this paper.  
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 shows the relative importance attached by respondents of various factors to their 
company’s choice of depreciation method (see question 5 in appendix 1): 
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Table 4: Mean Responses for Reasons for Choice of Depreciation Method 
Importance to Depreciation 
Method Choice of: 
Overall 
Mean 
Use Other 
Depreciation 
Use Only 
SLD 
Owner 
Managed 
Agent 
Managed 
PAT 
Effect on Net Income  2.911 2.556 3.000 2.732 3.061 
Technical 
Simplicity of Calculation  3.022 2.833 3.070 3.146 2.918 
Suitability for Class of Asset  4.538 4.525 4.525 4.558 4.520 
Importance of Industry Norm  4.178 4.611 4.085 4.415 3.980 
Note: Respondents answered using a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 = Not important at all, 5 = Very important. 
 
The overall means in the table indicate that the technical reasons identified in Panel B seem to 
be more important to managers than the PAT-based motive in Panel A. Managers rated the 
influence of the agency-related financial issue of impact on net income lower than suitability 
for class of asset and importance of industry norm, and indeed seem relatively indifferent to 
it. Even simplicity of calculation received better support than the PAT-based hypothesis, with 
the exception of the agent-managed group.   
When these differences are examined in more statistical detail, industry norm (overall 
mean = 4.178, p-value=0.000) and suitability for class of asset (overall mean = 4.538, p-
value=0.000) are given significantly more than neutral importance (i.e. 3) by managers [2]. 
The PAT-based variable can be tested against each of the technical reasons in Panel B by a 
paired-samples t-test. These tests reveal that, while simplicity of calculation is not 
significantly more important than the PAT-based reason (mean = 3.022, t = 0.577, one-sided 
p-value = 0.283), both industry norm (overall mean = 4.178, t = 6.57, p = 0.000) and 
suitability for class of asset (overall mean = 4.538, t = 10.648, p = 0.000) are given 
significantly more importance by managers. Acceptance of responses at their face value 
suggests that more ‘technical’ reasons exert a substantially greater influence on managers’ 
choice of depreciation methods than the motive identified by PAT. Interestingly, the 
‘simplicity’ rationale suggested by Hendriksen and Van Breda (1992) received no clear 
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support. That could be consistent with managers choosing rationalisations of their choices that 
they perceive reflect more favourably on themselves (in other words, they may think that 
‘simplicity’ reflected adversely on their technical capability). 
 The responses are sub-divided by splitting them into two further subsets. Following 
the arguments presented in the previous section on empirical hypotheses, the subsets of (a) 
SLD/non-SLD use, and (b) bonus plan/non bonus plan groups. Taking the first of these 
subsets, the difference between those using SLD and those using other forms of depreciation 
was expressed as a slight preference by firms using SLD for all four reasons except industry 
norm, where non-SLD users gave significantly (p = 0.005) higher importance (mean = 4.611) 
than SLD users (mean = 4.085). On the other hand, those (agent-managed) firms with bonus 
schemes rated the PAT-based reason slightly higher than (owner-managed) firms without a 
bonus scheme, but were more indifferent to technical reasons for depreciation choice. Such 
increased favouring of PAT-based motives for accounting choice is consistent with 
expectations, but this observation is tempered by the fact that in general, managers of firms 
with bonus schemes still rate technical reasons higher.  
The strong preference across the overall sample for technical reasons of industry 
norm and suitability for class of asset is worthy of note. However, the strength of this 
expressed preference should not necessarily be taken at face value. The general level of 
importance attached by respondents to the suitability of depreciation method to the class of 
asset does not appear to be reflected in the actual depreciation methods used. Table 2 shows 
that only three of the 93 surveyed firms did not use the same type of depreciation method 
across all types of asset. Unless one accepts that all classes of assets have similar economic 
characteristics, a comparison of tables 2 and 4 suggests a major inconsistency between the 
sentiments expressed by managers in the survey and the evidence from their actual 
depreciation choices. At the same time, however, the importance attached to industry norm 
appears to be more consistent with the available evidence in table 3, which suggests that some 
conformity exists in the depreciation choices made by managers in specific industrial sectors. 
The likely reasons for these contrasting comparisons will be explored later in the paper. 
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6. Tests of Hypotheses 
Table 5 summarises the results of testing the null hypotheses. Hypotheses (i) were tested 
using the Wilcoxon (1945) signed rank test of the median. Hypotheses (ii) were tested using 
Kendall’s Tau(b) measure of correlation for ordinal data (Kendall, 1970). For H1e(i) the 
statistical null hypothesis is that managers assign the neutral level of importance (3) to the 
effect on net income for the choice of depreciation methods while the alternative hypothesis 
states that the majority of managers assign greater importance (than 3) to the effect on net 
income. Consideration of table 5 indicates that it is not possible to reject the null (p = 0.862), 
so the alternative underlying hypothesis is not supported by managers’ responses. It is 
however interesting to note from table 4 that AM firms (with bonus schemes) are more 
supportive than OM firms. It could be reasonably assumed that managers might be averse to 
admitting that they are primarily motivated by self-interest. Consequently, it is not very 
surprising that they attribute choice by reference to technical accounting factors. For H1e(ii) 
the null hypothesis is that there is no association between the use of management bonus 
schemes and the use of straight-line depreciation (SLD), and the alternative is that there is a 
positive association between the use of management bonus schemes and the use of SLD. It is 
noteworthy that this more conventional analysis of the data conducted previously (Dey et al., 
2007) also showed a strongly significant (p = 0.000) rejection of the null for H1e(ii). This 
provides support for the alternative of H1e and suggests that the responses are inconsistent 
with observed behaviour that could be motivated by self-interest. 
 
Table 5: Summary of Results 
Support for Alternative Hypotheses  Sub hypothesis (i) Level of importance attached 
Sub-hypothesis (ii) 
Association with use of SLD 
H1e:  Effect on Net Income  N (p = 0.862) Y (p = 0.000) 
H2e: Simplicity of Calculation  N (p = 0.571) N (p = 0.268) 
H3e: Suitability for Class of Asset  Y (p = 0.000) N (p = 0.471) 
H4e: Importance of Industry Norm  Y (p = 0.000) N/A 
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 H2e is concerned with the possibility that simplicity of calculation affects managers’ 
choices of depreciation policy. Sub-hypothesis (i) relates to managers’ responses and the 
results for all respondents do not allow rejection of the null (p = 0.571). OM firms are more 
supportive than AM firms, but not significantly so (p = 0.208). Overall, there is no support 
from the survey for the alternative hypothesis. The sub-hypothesis H2e(ii) tested the 
compatibility of responses to H2e(i) with observed behaviour. It shows a positive relationship 
between support for simplicity and the use of SLD, which is contrary to the null and supports 
the alternative, but with a p-value of 0.268. Therefore, the evidence is consistent with the 
expected relationship between support for simplicity and adoption of SLD, but is not 
statistically significant.  
 ‘Suitability for class of asset’ receives significant support from the total sample of 
respondents with an overall mean of 4.538 and p-value of 0.000. The null for H3e(i) can 
therefore be rejected if one accepts the validity of the responses. Sub-hypotheses H3e(ii) 
sought to test that validity. It is clear from table 2 that very few firms use more than one 
depreciation method, regardless of the class of asset. Indeed only three of the ninety-three 
firms used anything other than SLD. Clearly this observation challenges the validity of 
managers’ responses concerning suitability for class of asset. A formal statistical test of the 
null sub-hypothesis of no association between the importance which managers assign to the 
suitability of method to the class of asset for the choice of depreciation methods and the 
extent to which they use different methods for different classes of asset would have low 
power when there is such near uniformity of choice of depreciation method over all asset 
classes.  
 Hypothesis H4e relates to the importance of consistency with accounting practice that 
predominates in a firm’s industry (i.e. ‘industry norms’). It is clear from Tables 4 and 5 that 
respondents assigned statistically significant emphasis to this reason. The null hypothesis to 
H4e is clearly rejected (p = 0.000), providing strong support for the alternative. To explore 
this further, it is helpful to impose a measurable definition of ‘industrial norm’, of use by at 
least 75% of firms in a sector. One could reason that firms which operate in industries that 
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conform to this criterion should rate the importance of ‘industrial norm’ more highly than 
those that do not. Of the 93 firms in table 3, 63 qualify as firms that operate within industries 
with measurable norms of depreciation method. The data for three firms are excluded, 
because they use both SLD and other depreciation methods, and a further three did not 
respond to the question. The mean responses for the remaining sub-sample of 87, are shown 
in table 6.  
Table 6: Analysis of responses to importance of industry norm 
All firms Firms operating in industries with 75% norm Importance of Industry Norm 
in Depreciation Choice n Mean n Mean 
SLD Users 72 4.07 53 4.04 
Non-SLD Users 15 4.73 10 4.60 
Total 87 4.18 63 4.13 
 
This table indicates that the subset of all firms which do not use SLD attribute even more 
importance to the existence of industrial norms than those firms which use SLD. The 
difference is statistically significant (one-tailed p = 0.024). Within the subset of firms 
operating in industries with measurable norms, this difference is slightly smaller and less 
significant (one-tailed p = 0.098). These observations do not increase the confidence in the 
credibility of the responses to the question concerning H4e.  
Based on the arguments detailed above, there is no conclusive evidence to support the 
validity of managers’ responses. They express a clear preference for two technical reasons for 
choosing depreciation methods. Nevertheless, the evidence concerning ‘suitability for class of 
asset’ suggests an inconsistency that could imply that managers merely rationalised their 
decisions.   
 
7. Conclusions 
As indicated above, most recent work on managerial decisions concerning accounting choices 
utilises data gathered from databases of published financial information and is undertaken 
within a PAT context. This study extends that approach in two ways. Firstly, it proposes some 
additional hypotheses that reflect possible technical accounting reasons for discussing 
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depreciation methods. Secondly, it utilises the results of a questionnaire distributed in Egypt 
(the latter was used, together with a more conventional database sample, in a PAT oriented 
study reported in Dey et al., 2007). This paper is concerned primarily with the survey-based 
data that allows the technical accounting hypotheses to be tested. 
 The answers provided by the respondents indicated no significant support for the 
PAT oriented hypotheses. Although the literature has identified simplicity of calculation as a 
possible technical reason for choosing SLD, that reason received no significant support from 
respondents. In contrast, ‘suitability for class of asset’ and ‘importance of industry norm’ 
received strong support. One could interpret the survey evidence as indicating no support 
from responses for (a) choices made to influence an accounting outcome that has potential 
economic consequences for the decision maker (i.e. PAT) and (b) simplicity (which could 
imply a lack of sophistication). In contrast, the two reasons that imply consideration of the 
relevance of the accounting decision for the appropriate interpretation of the economic 
meaning of figures of accounting income received strong support. 
 Unfortunately it is not possible to assign unreserved credibility to the responses. 
Firstly, the objective evidence for the bonus scheme hypothesis of PAT was strong (see Dey 
et al., 2007) and is inconsistent with the subjective responses to the PAT related questions in 
the survey. Secondly, the responses concerning suitability for class of asset seem to be 
inconsistent with the observation that almost all firms used the same depreciation method for 
all classes of asset. Thus there was a failure to discriminate between the characteristics of 
different classes. In respect of the importance of industry norm the observed evidence 
provides a weak challenge to the responses. Overall, one cannot reject the implication that 
managers may have been rationalising their choices by supporting the responses that looked 
likely to be the most acceptable if they were seeking to present unbiased and meaningful 
financial statements.  
 Clearly, conscious or unconscious rationalisation of personal reasons for accounting 
choice may affect all survey-based accounting studies of such choices. This creates a potential 
methodological limitation of that mode of research – because of the dependency on the face 
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value of responses. Nevertheless, there seems to be value in such studies, given the absence of 
multi-respondent alternatives. This paper has tested responses by reference to objective data 
which has added some evidence to a possible hypothesis that such rationalisations occur. In 
summary, the study indicates support from the objective evidence (but not from managers’ 
responses) for the PAT hypothesis that depreciation choices are influenced by the existence of 
agent-managers remunerated in part by bonus schemes. It does not provide convincing 
evidence that technical accounting alternatives to PAT may be the actual reasons for 
accounting choices. Instead, the responses to the survey reflected managers’ rationalisations 
of decisions made for self-interested purposes. 
                                                 
1 The calculation leading to 2.1 as 5% of 42 is based on the definition of the significance level of a test as the 
probability that it will result in rejection of a true null hypothesis. 
2 These p-values are from Student’s t-test applied to the mean (Pearson and Wishart 1942). Similar results are 
obtained using the non-parametric equivalent Wilcoxon test applied to the median (Wilcoxon, 1945). 
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Appendix 1: Survey questions 
 
The questionnaire used a five-point Likert scale with 1 equalling ‘not important’ and 5 
indicating ‘very important’. Some respondents did not answer in respect of all categories with 
each question. The total actual responses received are shown in italics. 
 
Q1. In which main industry group(s) does your company operate?  
 
20 3 
9 6 
3 5 
8 3 
7 11 
4 14 
 
Textile                                
Food & Spirits 
Steel  
Chemical production 
Construction  
Building materials 
 
 
     Hotels & Tourism 
Electrical application 
Wood & Paper 
Communications 
Pharmaceuticals & Medical 
Other (please specify): - 
____________________________  
 
Q2.  Please indicate your company’s ownership status.  
 
 Yes No 
One shareholder or one group (for example a family) owns 10% or more 
of the total share capital 
60 22 
A bank or insurance company owns 20% or more of the total share capital 7 49 
One group of up to five shareholders (either physical persons or legal 
entities), who are not members of the same family own 10% or more of 
the total share capital 
28 36 
Your company is a privatized company and the government still owns 
more than 50% of the total share capital 
1 56 
Your company is a privatized company and the government still owns 
less than 50% of the total share capital 
12 61 
 
Q3.  Does your company employ bonus schemes to remunerate members of its board of 
directors? 
Yes No 
50 
 
43 
 
Q4. What depreciation method does your company employ? 
 
Depreciation method                       
Class of asset Straight line depreciation Other 
Buildings  74 19 
Plant and machinery 74 19 
Vehicles  74 19 
Furniture 74 19 
Computers and office equipment 76 16 
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Q5. How important are the following for your choice of the depreciation method?  
(Scale: 1 = Not important at all, 2 = Not very important, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Important, 5 =Very 
important) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Industry norm 6 5 2 31 46 
Suitability for class of asset 1 1 5 26 60 
Simplicity of calculation 18 13 18 31 10 
Effect on net income 19 7 35 21 8 
 
 
  
  
